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ELECTION OBSERVATION POST-2020 
Rebecca Green* 
 
The United States is in the midst of a crisis in confidence in elections, 
despite the many process protections baked into every stage of election 
administration.  Part of the problem is that few Americans know just how 
rigorous the protections in place are, and most Americans have no concept 
of how modern elections are run.  Election observation statutes are intended 
to provide a window for members of the public to learn about and oversee 
the process and to satisfy themselves that elections are fair and that outcomes 
are reliable.  Yet in 2020, in part due to unforeseen pandemic conditions, 
election observation fell short.  This Essay examines the shortcomings of 
modern election observation in the United States, looks at reform proposals 
on the table, and suggests several principles that should inform efforts to 
address the most worrisome shortfalls. 
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INTRODUCTION 
How can we trust election outcomes?  This question leapt to the fore after 
the 2020 election as millions of Americans (to this day) think the country 
inaugurated the wrong person.1  A lack of public confidence in the 2020 
election outcome was not entirely unpredictable:  for the first time in U.S. 
history, a sitting president actively undermined public faith in our system of 
elections throughout his term in office (and beyond).2  In addition, the 
ravages of internet-fueled misinformation and disinformation threatens to 
destabilize democratic functioning.3  As a result, even before the massive 
disruptions brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic, many worried the public 
would not abide the result of the 2020 election.4 
In this fraught and hyperpolarized environment, state election observation 
mechanisms may have provided ways for members of the public to satisfy 
themselves that the election was fairly run.5  Generally speaking, state 
election observer statutes allow members of the public to observe election 
processes like ballot casting and counting.6  Virtually all states have election 
 
 1. See Harry Enten, Polls Show Majority of Republicans Mistakenly Think the 2020 
Election Wasn’t Legitimate, CNN (Apr. 11, 2021, 1:57 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/ 
04/11/politics/voting-restrictions-analysis/index.html [https://perma.cc/PH28-K9Q4]; Voter 
Confidence, MIT ELECTION DATA + SCIENCE LAB (Apr. 2, 2021), 
https://electionlab.mit.edu/research/voter-confidence [https://perma.cc/G2ZR-RQTV].  Low 
public confidence in U.S. election predates the tumultuous 2020 season. See, e.g., RJ Reinhart, 
Faith in Elections in Relatively Short Supply, GALLUP (Feb. 13, 2021), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/285608/faith-elections-relatively-short-supply.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/2NSQ-K5XR]. 
 2. Nicholas Kristoff, Opinion, When a President Sabotages His Own Country, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/04/opinion/donald-trump-election-
2020.html [https://perma.cc/V93W-FB7T]. 
 3. See Dawn Carla Nunziato, Misinformation Mayhem:  Social Media Platforms’ Efforts 
to Combat Medical and Political Misinformation, 19 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 32, 33, 93 (2020) 
(describing the effect of social media companies and the First Amendment on democratic 
deliberation and self-governance); Elizabeth Dwoskin, Misinformation on Facebook Got Six 
Times More Clicks Than Factual News During the 2020 Election, Study Says, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 4, 2021, 12:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/09/03/ 
facebook-misinformation-nyu-study/ [https://perma.cc/8DT6-43HF]. 
 4. For example, the National Task Force on Election Crises (the author is a member) was 
formed to address challenges to the peaceful transition of power. See About, NAT’L TASK 
FORCE ON ELECTION CRISES, https://www.electiontaskforce.org/about [https://perma.cc/3TS7-
P499] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021) (“Disruptions to elections can come from natural disasters 
or human-made disasters such as cyberattacks or improper interference by elected 
officials . . . .  [I]t’s critical to know the proper steps forward in dealing with a crisis to ensure 
a free and fair election.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Geoffrey Sheagley & Mollie Cohen, MIT Election Lab, Watchers at the 
Polls:  The Effect of Partisan Poll Watchers on Perceptions of Electoral Fairness, MEDIUM 
(Aug. 31, 2021), https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/watchers-at-the-polls-ca2e8f05592 
[https://perma.cc/CB87-BYE9] (noting that the presence of poll watchers bolsters the public 
trust in elections, particularly when watchers from both parties are present). 
 6. The terminology of election observation differs.  Many states refer to election 
observers as “poll watchers,” but the term is not universal.  For example, Connecticut refers 
to election observers as “unofficial checkers,” and Massachusetts refers to election observers 
as “observers.” See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-235 (2021); 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 54.04(22) 
(2021). 
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observation statutes, and though rules differ on who is allowed to see what, 
all share the same motivation:  to provide an avenue of transparency in the 
process to ensure that candidates and the public accept the result.7 
In 2020, state election observation did important work to calm a nervous 
public.  Yet, in many instances, election observation practices cracked under 
pressure.  At Detroit’s TCF Center, for example, chaos broke out during the 
ballot counting process.  Misunderstandings and miscommunications about 
observation rules—specifically, the number of partisan observers allowed at 
the site and rules governing what observers could and could not do—led to 
heated protests outside the counting room.8  Police formed a barricade 
blocking protestors from entryways into the TCF Center.9  Election workers 
reported feeling loomed over and intimidated.10  Democratic and Republican 
representatives volleyed complaints that observers and elections officials 
failed to adhere to the law.11 
Election observation problems arose in Detroit and elsewhere in 2020, in 
part, because of the particular burdens the COVID-19 pandemic placed on 
observers’ ability to monitor election processes.12  COVID-19 restrictions 
 
 7. See Policies for Election Observers, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES  
(Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/policies-for-
election-observers.aspx [https://perma.cc/9XYM-4QEZ] (providing a state-by-state overview 
of observer rules in place in 2020); see also Katyovi, Election 2020 in Review:  Poll Watchers, 
Observers and the Ballot Duplication Process, OVERSEAS VOTING INITIATIVE (Mar. 30, 2021), 
https://ovi.csg.org/election-2020-in-review-remote-observation/ [https://perma.cc/TMB6-
YM2M] (describing state rules governing election observation).  West Virginia is the only 
state that prohibits election observers. See W.VA. CODE § 3-1-37 (2021). 
 8. See Breana Noble & Craig Mauger, Shouting, Confrontation at Detroit Vote Count 
Center:  Poll Challengers Barred by Police, DETROIT NEWS (Nov. 4, 2020, 12:48 PM), 
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2020/11/04/poll-challengers-converge-
detroit-amid-close-election-results/6161484002/ [https://perma.cc/5ZPB-XCBB].  For an 
overview of observation rules that applied in Michigan, see MICH. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU 
OF ELECTIONS, THE APPOINTMENT, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF ELECTION CHALLENGERS AND  
POLL WATCHERS 4 (2020), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/ 
SOS_ED_2_CHALLENGERS_77017_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9ZQ-8JM7]. 
 9. See Noble & Mauger, supra note 8. 
 10. Id.; see also Joe Capozzi, Trump Backers, Poll Workers Clash in Florida:  ‘My Early 
Voting Site Was Almost Like a War Zone,’ PALM BEACH POST (Nov. 6, 2020, 2:49 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/06/donald-trump-backers-
poll-workers-clash-florida-early-voting-site/6190693002/ [https://perma.cc/GCZ2-UFRN]; 
Michael Wines, Harassed and Harangued, Poll Workers Now Have a New Form of Defense, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/18/us/election-workers-
legal-aid.html [https://perma.cc/WJ4Q-2V5X]; Joey Oliver, Detroit Election Workers 
Describe ‘Aggressive’ Poll Challengers, PATCH (Nov. 6, 2020, 10:36 AM), 
https://patch.com/michigan/detroit/detroit-election-workers-describe-aggressive-poll-
challengers [https://perma.cc/G4ZT-Y8LL]. 
 11. Madeline Halpert et al., Detroit Poll Challengers Were in the Same Room, but Had 
Different Accounts, BRIDGE MICHIGAN (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-
government/detroit-poll-challengers-were-same-room-had-different-accounts 
[https://perma.cc/U6C6-VDLY]. 
 12. Carol Morello, International Election Observers in the U.S. Consider This Year the 
Most Challenging Ever, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2020, 3:17 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/election-international-
monitors/2020/10/22/91712842-13c4-11eb-82af-864652063d61_story.html 
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forced observers, for example, to stand farther away from the processes they 
observed than they might have in a typical election.13  The model of 
observers peering over the shoulder of election workers was simply not safe 
in November 2020. 
The 2020 election also featured dramatic differences in how voters cast 
ballots.  States with traditionally low mail-in voting rates saw huge spikes in 
2020 since many perceived voting by mail to be a safer option during the 
pandemic.14  The challenge in processing and counting mail-in ballots in 
states not accustomed to high volumes garnered much attention.  Many states 
had inadequate time to consider not only how to manage election observation 
in a pandemic but also how to do so amidst drastically changed methods of 
ballot casting and counting. 
Even beyond pandemic-related disruptions, election observation rules 
were in many ways doomed to fall short for a variety of reasons.  In a trend 
starting decades ago, fewer and fewer Americans cast ballots at polling 
places on Election Day—a condition that many election transparency rules 
assume.  The “disembodied voter” is harder to keep tabs on, making it 
difficult for election observers to serve their function as proxies of public 
trust in elections.15  In addition, in today’s easily manipulated information 
environment, technology tools intended to boost public confidence in 
elections sometimes undermined it.  Finally, a lack of uniformity in election 
observation rules contributed to confusion and mistrust.  These factors 
combined to reduce the effectiveness of election observation mechanisms 
when the American public arguably needed them most. 
Since the 2020 election, a growing number of state legislatures are 
exploring election observation reform.16  As discussed below, election 
 
[https://perma.cc/WB8J-2TTY] (describing how due to COVID-19 concerns, international 
observers scaled back operations in the United States). 
 13. See, e.g., infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 14. See David Landau et al., Federalism, Democracy, and the 2020 Election, 99 TEX. L. 
REV. ONLINE 96, 107, 112–13 (2021) (describing unprecedented levels of absentee voting in 
2020); John Taschner, Recapturing Democracy:  COVID-19 and the 2020 Presidential 
Election, 48 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 461, 480 (2021) (discussing the unique nature of how 
absentee balloting impacted the 2020 election); see also Miles Parks, Why Vote Counting in 
Pennsylvania and Michigan Takes So Long, NPR (Nov. 4, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/11/04/931136905/we-ll-be-working-24-hours-vote-counting-to-
continue-through-the-week [https://perma.cc/M63B-ENZR]. 
 15. The idea of a “disembodied voter” is adapted from surveillance studies literature.  
Voting processes increasingly take place without face-to-face interaction, for example through 
online voter registration and mail balloting.  This mimics a phenomenon surveillance studies 
scholars have identified with respect to financial and other transactions in modern life. See, 
e.g., Josh Lauer, From Rumor to Written Record:  Credit Reporting and the Invention of 
Financial Identity in Nineteenth-Century America, 49 TECH & CULTURE 301, 301, 304, 306 
(2008) (discussing the shift of creditworthiness determinations with the rise of “disembodied” 
financial identities in the nineteenth century). 
 16. According to the Brennan Center for Justice, as of mid-April 2021, twenty states have 
entertained legislation to reform election observer rules. See Eliza Sweren-Becker, Who 
Watches the Poll Watchers?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 29, 2021), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/who-watches-poll-watchers 
[https://perma.cc/E8QC-3W7R] (noting that, “[o]f those, 12 bills are moving in six states,” 
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observation reform is needed.  Some proposals address core problems 
exposed during the 2020 elections.  Other proposals threaten, paradoxically, 
to contribute to eroding public confidence in election outcomes.17  This Essay 
examines U.S. election observation rules and reforms in three parts.  It first 
discusses key shortcomings of election observation in 2020.  It then 
canvasses proposed state election observation reforms post-2020.  Finally, it 
offers recommendations to help right the ship. 
I.  WHY ELECTION OBSERVATION STATUTES FELL SHORT IN 2020 
A comprehensive review of the history of state election observer rules 
pre-2020 is beyond the scope of this Essay.  But, for purposes of laying out 
the successes and shortcomings of election observation rules in 2020, a short 
overview of state election observer basics will set the stage.  As a preliminary 
matter, this Essay focuses on election observation rules and practice.  It does 
not tackle a related, but very different, role of the election “challenger,” 
which allows certain individuals (usually party or candidate designees and, 
sometimes, observers themselves) to challenge a voter’s eligibility to register 
or cast a ballot at the polls.18  The present effort confines discussion to 
election observation in part for analytic clarity and, in part, because 
observation rules have received less attention among legal scholars.19 
 
and that “[t]he plurality of bills introduced and currently moving have been filed in Texas”).  
Two such bills are now law. See id. (noting that the bills are “GA SB 202, IA SF 413”). 
 17. Importantly, every aspect of state election processes builds in protections to ensure 
the accuracy and reliability of the outcomes.  From preelection machine certification, to rules 
requiring members of both parties to serve as election judges, to postelection audits, American 
elections are designed to inspire confidence before, during, and after Election Day. See Rachel 
Wright, Election Safeguards—Combating Election Disinformation, OVERSEAS VOTING 
INITIATIVE (Oct. 29, 2020), https://ovi.csg.org/blog-election-safeguards/ 
[https://perma.cc/SMA3-VYJT]; Danielle Root et al., Election Security in All 50 States, CTR. 
FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 12, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/democracy/reports/2018/02/12/446336/election-security-50-states/ 
[https://perma.cc/LD6D-T2NM] (describing the many procedural safeguards in place to 
ensure U.S. elections are secure and accurate).  The present effort examines only one aspect 
of this complex web:  statutes governing observation by candidate or party representatives, 
the media, and/or members of the public. 
 18. For an excellent critique of the partisan election challenger role, see Gilda R. Daniels, 
Outsourcing Democracy:  Redefining Public-Private Partnerships in Election Administration, 
88 DENVER U.L. REV. 237 (2010); see also NICOLAS RILEY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., VOTER 
CHALLENGERS (2012), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/ 
Voter_Challengers.pdf [https://perma.cc/C33P-8Z67] (documenting the troubling racially 
discriminatory origin of the challenge process). 
 19. This attempt at analytic clarity is somewhat stymied by state observation statutes that 
sometimes conflate the role of observer and challenger. See infra note 30 (noting, for example, 
that Rhode Island law permits observers to challenge voter eligibility).  This Essay also does 
not delve into federal observer laws and practices, discussed infra at note 158.  For useful 
analysis of these requirements, see generally James Thomas Tucker, The Power of 
Observation:  The Role of Federal Observers Under the Voting Rights Act, 13 MICH. J. RACE 
& L. 227 (2007).  See also About Federal Observers and Monitoring, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-federal-observers-and-election-monitoring 
[https://perma.cc/JL6L-Z2F6] (Sept. 11, 2020). 
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Election observation rules generally permit observation at four phases 
during the elections process:  (1) observation of preelection processes (e.g., 
voting equipment testing), (2) observation of in-person voting, (3) 
observation of absentee ballot processing and counting, and (4) observation 
of postelection processes (e.g., tabulation, audits, and recounts).  The 
majority of states permit observation of some kind at all four stages.  
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, during the 2020 
election, only six states lacked statutes permitting public observation of 
preelection processes.20  Only one state (Nebraska) lacked rules permitting 
observation of in-person voting.21  Nine states and the District of Columbia 
lacked statutes permitting observation of absentee ballot processing and 
counting,22 and only one state lacked provisions for postelection observation 
(Wyoming).23 
Despite the widespread practice in most states of allowing observers to 
watch before, during, and after elections, state statutes vary in who can be an 
observer and what observers can and cannot do in their roles.  Almost all 
states rely on a system of partisan election observation by which political 
parties or candidates appoint observers.24  Critics of partisan observation 
suggest that partisan observers are not present to ensure elections are fair but 
instead work against basic fairness principles because they push a particular 
partisan agenda.25  This is almost certainly why international observation 
principles require nonpartisan observation.26  Yet, much like the justice 
 
 20. Those states are Alabama, Alaska, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, and Tennessee. 
See Policies for Election Observers, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 13, 2020), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/policies-for-election-
observers.aspx# [https://perma.cc/9XYM-4QEZ]. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  Those states are Alaska, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, 
West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. (“Almost all states, with a few exceptions, have statutory provisions for partisan 
citizen election observers.  It is common practice for political parties and candidates to appoint 
poll watchers and/or challengers to observe elections.”).  Partisan involvement in U.S. 
elections has a long history. See Rebecca Green, Rethinking Transparency in U.S. Elections, 
75 OHIO ST. L.J. 779, 786 (2014) (describing partisan, rather than state-sponsored, 
management of elections in the eighteenth century); id. (“States relied heavily on powerful 
political parties to do much of the work of administering elections—a task parties were only 
too happy to undertake.  Nineteenth-century American elections were run largely out of 
government hands.  Parties printed and distributed ballots, brought (their) voters to polling 
places, and oversaw vote tabulation.  Polling locations were commonly housed in 
non-state-owned establishments such as private homes, hotels, saloons, and stores.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Alexa Ura, Texas Senate Advances Bill Limiting How and When Voters Can 
Cast Ballots, Receive Mail-in Voting Applications, TEX. TRIBUNE (Apr. 1, 2021, 2:00 AM), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2021/04/01/texas-voting-restrictions-legislature/ 
[https://perma.cc/KPV9-AY24] (arguing that “[p]oll watchers are not public watchdogs but 
instead inherently partisan figures, appointed by candidates and political parties to serve at 
polling places”). 
 26. See, e.g., Declaration of Global Principles for Nonpartisan Election Observation and 
Monitoring by Citizen Organizations, GLOB. NETWORK OF DOMESTIC ELECTION MONITORS, 
https://gndem.org/declaration-of-global-principles/ [https://perma.cc/5SG8-6NFM] (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2021) (“Non-partisan election observation and monitoring by citizen 
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system relies on the adversarial process to ensure fair judicial outcomes, a 
system of elections that employs candidate- and party-appointed election 
observers seeks to achieve much the same effect:  to ensure that the voters of 
each candidate or party are protected and that elections are administered 
according to the law.  At least in theory, assuming all candidates’ and parties’ 
observers are diligent in their roles, and further assuming they are given 
meaningful access to the election process to satisfy themselves that elections 
are fairly run, results are more likely to be abided.27  Still, the shortcomings 
of partisan observation are, no doubt, why thirty-three states allow 
nonpartisan observers (i.e., members of the public not appointed by political 
parties or candidates) in addition to, or sometimes instead of, partisan 
observers.28 
Most states affirmatively list activities observers are permitted to do and/or 
are prohibited from doing.29  Some states take diametrically opposed 
approaches.  Rhode Island, for example, explicitly allows observers to 
challenge voters,30 whereas Wyoming prohibits observers from doing so.31  
As discussed further below, no two state election observation statutes are 
alike. 
 
organizations has emerged as one of the most tangible and significant dimensions of 
democratic development around the globe.”). 
 27. Sheagley & Cohen, supra note 5; Judd Choate, Director of the Division of Elections 
in Colorado, takes this concept even further.  When he started in his role in 2009, his office 
was embroiled in twenty different lawsuits. Conversation with Judd Choate, Dir., Div. of 
Elections, Colo. (May 28, 2021) (notes on file with author).  Aggravated by the high volume 
of litigation, Choate decided to involve attorneys representing both Democrats and 
Republicans in every major decision his office made about the administration of state 
elections. Id.  He reports convening regular meetings—sometimes monthly, sometimes 
weekly, sometimes more than once weekly—to get partisans’ perspectives and buy-in. Id.  Of 
the practice, Choate reports, “I think the single most important thing that we have ever done 
to create confidence in our election is that for every major decision we make, Democrats and 
Republicans are in the room . . . .  Whether [or not their side] won the election, they say, ‘I 
understand why these decisions were made.’” Id. 
 28. In some instances, a state’s statute may not explicitly provide for nonpartisan 
observers, but, in practice, election officials allow nonpartisan observers to watch. See Policies 
for Election Observers, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 13, 2020), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/policies-for-election-observers.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/9XYM-4QEZ] (“Fourteen state [sic] don’t explicitly authorize nonpartisan 
citizen observers in statu[t]e but have allowed them in practice in the past.  This may be left 
up to the discretion of the state or local election officials and evaluated on a case by case basis:  
Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, 
Nebraska (will explicitly allow them in statute beginning Nov. 14, 2020), New Jersey, New 
York, North Carolina and Oregon.”). 
 29. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 39A.4.1.b (2021) (prohibiting observers from activities such 
as handling or inspecting ballots, voting equipment, or voter rolls; inspecting documents 
produced by voters to establish their identity; comparing signatures on record to a signature 
on any document or ballot or ballot envelope). 
 30. 17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-19-22 (2021) (“The watchers and any election official shall 
have the right to challenge the right to vote of any person offering himself or herself as a 
voter.”). 
 31. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-15-109(b) (2021) (“A poll watcher is authorized to observe 
voter turnout and registration and may make written memoranda but shall not challenge voters, 
conduct electioneering activities or disrupt the polling process.”). 
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With these basics in mind, the following discussion suggests three 
important reasons election observation rules fell short in 2020:  (1) a 
mismatch between anachronistic observer rules and how modern elections 
are, in fact, run; (2) misfires when measures designed to increase 
transparency instead fueled conspiracy theories; and (3) a lack of uniformity 
in election observation rules among states and within states.  The following 
discussion considers each in turn. 
A.  Mismatch 
The 2020 election exposed a mismatch between the rules governing 
observers and the way modern elections are run.  Many observer statutes 
were written when the casting and counting of ballots in this country looked 
very different.  Pennsylvania, for example, was a poster child for this 
problem.  The observer statute in place in Pennsylvania in 2020 provided that 
candidate- and party-appointed observers may be present at “polling places” 
from the “time the election officers meet prior to the opening of the polls 
until the time that the counting of votes is complete and the district register 
and voting check list is locked and sealed.”32  Pennsylvania’s observer statute 
made no provision for observation of pre–Election Day in-person voting, 
which the Pennsylvania legislature enabled by statute in 2019 via Act 77.33  
During the 2016 election, approximately 2 percent of Pennsylvania voters 
cast absentee ballots.34  With the change to no-excuse absentee voting, 
election administrators had time to prepare for an increase in votes cast this 
way.  But they could not have anticipated that, due to COVID-19, over 50 
percent of Pennsylvanians would cast early absentee ballots in 2020.35 
The 2019 law permitted voters to request and receive an absentee ballot in 
person at a County Elections Office (CEO).36  On January 10, 2021, the 
Pennsylvania secretary of state issued guidance on in-person absentee voting, 
noting that the law provided for in-person absentee voting at more than one 
CEO located within a county.37  The guidance advised that “[a]dditional 
 
 32. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2687(b) (2021). 
 33. Specifically, Act 77 provided for no-excuse mail-in voting—including in-person 
absentee voting before Election Day—for all qualified electors. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§§ 3150.11–3150.17 (2021).  Pennsylvania previously required absentee voters to provide a 
sanctioned excuse to obtain an absentee ballot. See 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3302 (2002). 
 34. DIANA CAO ET AL., HEALTHYELECTIONS.ORG, PENNSYLVANIA  
ELECTION ANALYSIS (2020), https://healthyelections.org/sites/default/files/2020-
08/Pennsylvania%20Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/RN9M-Y9DC] (noting that mail-in and 
absentee voting, combined, increased from 2 percent in 2016 to 51 percent in 2020). 
 35. Id. 
 36. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3146.5(b)(2) (2021) (“[A] voter who presents the voter’s own 
application for an absentee or mail-in ballot within the office of the county board of elections 
during regular business hours may request to receive the voter’s absentee or mail-in ballot 
while the voter is at the office.  Upon presentation of the application and the making of the 
request and upon approval under [applicable law], the county board of elections shall promptly 
present the voter with the voter’s absentee or mail-in ballot.”). 
 37. See PA. DEP’T OF STATE, PENNSYLVANIA APPLICATIONS AND BALLOTING GUIDANCE:  
MAIL-IN AND ABSENTEE BALLOTS AND VOTER REGISTRATION CHANGES 4 (2020), 
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business hours for CEOs may be established” and encouraged local election 
officials to offer voters opportunities to vote in-person absentee on 
weeknights and weekends “to enable maximum flexibility and convenience 
to voters.”38  The guidance also included multiple requirements for these 
satellite offices to ensure the integrity of the process.39 
Citing concerns about early absentee voting in Pennsylvania, the Trump 
campaign sought access to observe election activities at satellite locations 
pursuant to Pennsylvania’s election observation statute.  On October 3, 2020, 
after election officials refused to allow the campaign to observe at satellite 
voting locations, the Trump campaign filed an emergency petition seeking 
court-ordered access.40  The trial court denied the campaign’s request on 
October 9, 2020,41 as did the appellate court on October 23, 2020.42  Both 
courts reasoned that the election observation statute applied only to “polling 
places” and that “satellite election offices are ‘not polling places . . . at which 
watchers have a right to be present under the Election Code.’”43  After all, 
the trial court explained, “polling places operate only on Election Day and 
are available only to voters residing in specific districts, whereas satellite 
offices are restricted by neither date nor location.”44 
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Patricia A. McCullough pointed out that 
the “plain language definition of a ‘polling place’ is ‘the room . . . for voting 
at a primary or election.’”45  Judge McCullough reasoned that “this language 
strongly suggests that the paramount and dispositive trait of a ‘polling place’ 
is that it is a location where an elector can go and cast his/her vote in person 
and in a private space, which, undisputedly, is what the Satellite Offices 
offer, allow, and do.”46  Judge McCullough further cautioned that “the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has long held that courts should construe the 
election laws liberally so ‘[t]echnicalities should not be used to make the 
right of the voter insecure.’”47 
At the heart of this dispute was a mismatch between the statute’s language 
and its underlying intent.  The statute’s language contemplated observing at 




 38. Id. 
 39. See id. at 4–5.  Some requirements include:  (1) each CEO be staffed by appointed 
elections personnel, (2) CEOs be located in municipal or county-owned or leased property, 
and (3) CEOs have secure county network connections and secure collection receptacles. Id. 
 40. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Phila. Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No. 200902035, 
2020 WL 6260837 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas Oct. 3, 2020). 
 41. Trump v. Philadelphia Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 241 A.3d 120, at *2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2020) (unpublished table decision). 
 42. Id. at *3. 
 43. Id. at *2. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at *16 (McCullough, J., dissenting) (quoting 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2602(q) 
(2021)). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at *12 (quoting Appeal of James, 105 A.2d 64, 66 (Pa. 1954)). 
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Pennsylvania historically took place at polling places on Election Day.48  But 
the statute’s intent—to allow transparency in the voting process—should 
clearly encompass the new mode of casting early in-person absentee ballots 
enabled by Act 77 if the goal is to ensure public confidence in election 
outcomes.49 
Even aside from massive increases in mail-in voting due to COVID-19, 
voting in many states no longer resembles the quaint neighborhood Election 
Day of yore.  For example, many states have moved to the “vote center” 
model to promote efficiency, among other reasons.50  Sweeping changes in 
how Americans cast ballots, predating the 2020 election, means that many 
observer statutes may do little to achieve their purpose.  Instead, the 
mismatch threatens to feed narratives that something is amiss. 
The same is true of statutes enabling postelection observation.  Machine 
counts have long been the target of ire for those concerned about transparent 
elections.51  The battle to scrap voting machines that lack a paper trail has 
largely been won.52  But, the idea that observers can meaningfully attest that 
the counting of votes is fair is undermined by out-of-date postelection 
observer statutes that do not account for how postelection ballot processing 
and tallying is accomplished.53 
 
 48. See CAO ET AL., supra note 34 (noting that mail-in and absentee voting, combined, 
increased from 2 percent in 2016 to 51 percent in 2020). 
 49. Certainly, COVID-19-related concerns contributed to the denial of access in this case.  
As the court noted in a footnote, “Lingering indefinitely in indoor offices where many 
members of the public come and go is not recommended for health reasons in light of the 
COVID-19 pandemic that is ongoing at this time.” Trump, 241 A.3d 120, at *11 n.42.  Yet as 
the dissent pointed out, city officials “regularly extended numerous invitations to the public 
encouraging electors to vote at the Satellite Offices, which has resulted in large numbers of 
electors visiting these sites daily.” Id. at *14 (McCullough, J., dissenting).  Furthermore, the 
dissent noted that many satellite offices were “set up in large gymnasiums or rooms which 
provide ample opportunity for spacing and social distancing, including the wearing of masks.” 
Id. 
 50. For a detailed list of states that consolidate voting and voting processes, see 
Introduction, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-
and-campaigns/vote-centers.aspx [https://perma.cc/WQC3-5XCW] (last visited Sept. 17, 
2021). 
 51. Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase:  Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1734–35 (2005) (describing common concerns with electronic 
voting); Andrew W. Appel & Philip B. Stark, Evidence-Based Elections:  Create A 
Meaningful Paper Trail, Then Audit, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 523, 525 (2020) (discussing 
reliability and auditability of voting machines). 
 52. See Voting System Paper Trail Requirements, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
(June 27, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voting-system-
paper-trail-requirements.aspx [https://perma.cc/83VP-5QHC]; see also Appel & Stark, supra 
note 51, at 526 (noting that “because of the widespread recognition of this fatal flaw, only a 
handful of states use paperless [direct-recording electronic] voting machines, and many of 
those states are transitioning to technologies that have a paper trail starting from the individual 
voter’s ballot”). 
 53. See Tim Harper et al., Counting the Vote During the 2020 Election, BIPARTISAN POL’Y 
CTR. (Aug 25, 2020), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/report/counting-the-vote-during-the-2020-
election/ [https://perma.cc/4JAF-NH2S] (describing absentee ballot tabulation at centralized 
locations); see also HEALTHYELECTIONS.ORG, FROM TABULATION TO CERTIFICATION:  HOW 
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Pennsylvania saw this question litigated as well in 2020.  The Trump 
campaign brought suit challenging inadequate positioning of 
candidate-appointed observers during pre-canvassing and canvassing 
processes.54  The Trump campaign argued that the statute’s requirement, 
allowing designated watchers “to be present when the envelopes containing 
official absentee ballots and mail-in ballots are opened and when such ballots 
are counted and recorded,”55 should be read to “require[] that . . . observers 
have the opportunity to ‘meaningfully . . . see the process.’”56  The trial court 
and, ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the 
statute mandated only that observers be present, not that they meaningfully 
be able to see election processes.57 
Again, the dispute boiled down to parsing an outdated statute that did not 
reflect the reality of postelection ballot processing.  The statutory mandate 
that observers be allowed “in the room” reflects voting in an era in which 
election processes took places in “rooms” as we traditionally understand 
them not cavernous sports arenas and convention centers where postelection 
processes often take place—as they did even before 2020.  Increasingly, 
states consolidate postelection processes as election officials around the 
country embrace, to varying degrees, the vastly improved efficiencies and 
accuracy that centralized processing affords.58 
Automated processing and counting of ballots produce more accurate and 
reliable counts.59  But mismatched election observation rules have, in many 
instances, not caught up:  many state election observer rules fail to give 
observers “meaningful access”60 (to use the Trump campaign’s term) or 
 
BATTLEGROUND STATES COUNT THE VOTE (2020), https://healthyelections.org/ 
sites/default/files/2020-11/Counting_the_Vote.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7GR-UVKU]. 
 54. In re Canvassing Observation, 241 A.3d 339, 443 (Pa. 2020), cert. denied sub 
nom. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Degraffenreid, 141 S. Ct. 1451 (2021). 
 55. See id. (quoting 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3146.8(b) (2021)). 
 56. Id. at 343.  “While this language contemplates an opportunity to broadly observe the 
mechanics of the canvassing process, we note that these provisions do not set a minimum 
distance between authorized representatives and canvassing activities occurring while they 
‘remain in the room.’  The General Assembly, had it so desired, could have easily established 
such parameters; however, it did not.  It would be improper for this Court to judicially rewrite 
the statute by imposing distance requirements where the legislature has, in the exercise of its 
policy judgment, seen fit not to do so.” Id. at 350. 
 57. Id. at 350–51. Another aspect of this problem is the mismatch between the number of 
observers statutes permit and the need for observers to meaningfully observe.  Some statutes 
have not kept pace with modern election operations and allow too few observers to be present.  
For example, Georgia law permits no more than two poll watchers from each political party, 
political body, or independent candidate to be at the same precinct at the same time. GA. CODE 
ANN. § 21-2-408 (2021). 
 58. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, seventeen states use vote 
centers that consolidate election processes. See Introduction, supra note 50. 
 59. See, e.g., Stephen N. Goggin et al., Post-Election Auditing:  Effects of Election 
Procedure and Ballot Type on Manual Counting Accuracy, Efficiency and Auditor 
Satisfaction and Confidence, 11 ELECTION L.J. 36, 42, 50 (2012) (concluding that hand counts 
of votes are unreliable). 
 60. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.  Similar issues arose in Nevada in 
November 2020. See Christina A. Cassidy & Anthony Izaguirre, Poll Watchers Emerge as a 
Flashpoint in Battle over Ballots, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 5, 2020), 
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otherwise provide adequate transparency to satisfy observers that 
postelection ballot processing was fair.61  Election observation rules must 
better account for new tallying environments and include methods to allow 
observers to understand and verify that election processes are proceeding 
lawfully—and to then translate that reassurance to the broader public. 
Some states are much further along in updating observer rules to reflect 
consolidated and/or automated election processes than others.  Colorado, 
widely recognized for its modern, thoughtful, and transparent election 
processes,62 provides an excellent example.  Colorado, an all-mail voting 
state, provides clear rules that give observers significant access to election 
processes without relying on outdated, opaque language referencing 
conditions no longer in place.  For example, Colorado election regulations 
use broad language, requiring that observers be allowed to watch whenever 




b4e95da6bcf2c8c0e9fda190b332d6d5 [https://perma.cc/25GJ-HEM8] (describing how the 
Trump campaign filed suit seeking to halt the counting of mail ballots in Clark County, 
Nevada, because its observers “were being kept too far away to be able to see if signatures 
matched voter registration records”). 
 61. What constitutes “meaningful access” has not been fully fleshed out.  Some might 
argue it requires being close enough to see voters’ IDs or to see both signatures as election 
officials conduct absentee ballot signature matches. See, e.g., Ga. Republican Party, Inc. v. 
Sec’y of State for Ga., No. 20-14741, 2020 WL 7488181, at *1 (11th Cir. Dec. 21, 2020) (suit 
filed in 2020 to, inter alia, require election officials to provide meaningful access to observers 
watching absentee ballot signature matching process).  Note that some state statutes explicitly 
prohibit such access. See, e.g., supra note 29.  Iowa recognizes that access must be balanced 
against other concerns. See id.  Courts, too, have long recognized that access for observers 
cannot come at the cost of voter intimidation or disruption of election processes. See, e.g., 
Poniktera v. Seiler, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 121, 136–38 (Ct. App. 2010) (upholding a prohibition 
on recording inside polling places, discussed at infra note 107). 
 62. Colorado has been far out front in a variety of ways when it comes to election 
transparency.  In 2017, Colorado became the first state to require a Risk-Limiting Audit after 
the Colorado Legislature set the process in motion to require them in 2009. See COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 1-7-515 (2021); Dylan Lynch, Checking the Election:  Risk-Limiting Audits, NAT’L 
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 3, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/checking-the-election-risk-limiting-audits.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZAX5-J2ZV].  
In 2014, Colorado’s secretary of state launched the Accountability in Colorado Elections 
portal, which contains comprehensive data on voter registration statistics, voter registrations 
by district, voter turnout by party affiliation, election cost statistics, voting methods and ballot 
statistics, and legal requirements. See Accountability in Colorado Elections, COLO. SEC’Y OF 
STATE, https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/ACE/index.html [https://perma.cc/F3SK-
FXF5] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).  One reason cited for Colorado’s election transparency 
success is the active involvement of election administrators in developing policy. See, e.g., 
Marshall Zelinger, How Did Colorado Get Really Good at Elections?:  By Having Really Bad 
Ones Before, 9NEWS (Nov. 6, 2020, 9:48 PM), https://www.9news.com/article/ 
news/local/next/how-did-colorado-get-really-good-at-elections-by-having-really-bad-ones-
before/73-364ce63d-8ec6-4039-977f-cf8ca2ccbce7 [https://perma.cc/LN4A-VN88] 
(“Colorado has been really great because election officials have been relied upon by the 
legislature to make recommendations on changes, and the legislature has worked with election 
officials to make those changes . . . .”). 
 63. See COLO. CODE REGS. § 1505-1 (2021).  The text of Rule 8.7 under § 1505-1 reads, 
“[t]he county clerk must submit a watcher accommodation plan to the Secretary of State by 
email using the approved form no later than 90 days before an election . . . Watchers may be 
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In addition, Colorado has recognized that, particularly since its shift to 
all-mail voting in 2013, traditional election observation practices needed 
rethinking and updating.  This is reflected not just in its rules for election 
observers being synchronized to how Colorado conducts its elections but also 
in Colorado’s adoption of sophisticated processes to ensure the reliability of 
election outcomes.  This includes sophisticated signature-matching software 
for mail ballots,64 rigorous risk-limiting audit procedures,65 and an 
impressive statistics portal that provides comprehensive and accessible data 
from Colorado elections.66 
 
present at each stage of the conduct of the election, including when electors are voting or when 
election judges are present and performing election activities . . . The county clerk must 
provide, and identify in some manner, at least one primary contact for watchers at each 
location where election activities are performed when watchers are present . . . At voter 
service and polling centers, the designated election official must position the voting 
equipment, voting booths, and the ballot box so that they are in plain view of the election 
officials and watchers . . . Watchers must remain outside the immediate voting area while an 
elector is voting.  The six-foot limit in Rule 1.1.31 applies only to voting.” Id.  Another 
important feature of Colorado election administration is Colorado election officials’ plenary 
power.  The legislature creates the rules that govern elections, but the secretary of state has 
power to implement those rules.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1–1–107(2)(a) (2021) (“[T]he 
secretary of state has the following powers: . . .  [t]o promulgate, publish, and distribute . . . 
such rules as the secretary of state finds necessary for the proper administration and 
enforcement of the election laws.”).  Judd Choate, the director of the Division of Elections, 
described it as akin to the legislature framing the house and elections officials putting in the 
drywall and dormers. See Conversation with Judd Choate, supra note 27.  The benefit of this 
structure is that election officials, who are most familiar with the specifics of running a modern 
election, are empowered to make decisions about how best to realize the legislative mandate. 
Id.  In the 2020 election cycle, the power of secretaries of state to make decisions about 
election administration strained under the weight of arguments that the U.S. Constitution 
delegates the exclusive power to decide how elections are run to state legislatures.  Both 
Georgia and Arizona have moved to strip power over the elections process from their states’ 
secretaries of state. See Aaron Blake, 2 Secretaries of State Undercut Trump’s Fraud Claims 
in Key, GOP-Controlled States.  Republicans Have Now Voted to Strip Both of Power, WASH. 
POST (June 26, 2021, 10:02 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/ 
05/27/gops-brazen-move-strip-power-fraud-narrative-busting-secretary-state-again/ 
[https://perma.cc/YT2R-BXDH].  Practically, however, to use Choate’s analogy, state statutes 
by their nature can only frame the structure. See Conversation with Judd Choate, supra note 
27.  Myriad decisions can and must be made by those who administer elections, whether 
statewide or at the local level.  That is the nature of the U.S. election system. See Jocelyn 
Friedrichs Benson, Democracy and the Secretary:  The Crucial Role of State Election 
Administrators in Promoting Accuracy and Access to Democracy, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 343, 359–60 (2008) (describing the decentralized nature of U.S. elections and the 
rulemaking power of secretaries of state and local officials). 
 64. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-7.5-107.3 (2021); Sandra Fish, Colorado Election:  How 
County Clerks Verify Voter Signatures on Mail-In Ballots, COLORADOAN (Oct. 9, 2020, 3:55 
PM), https://www.coloradoan.com/story/news/2020/10/09/colorado-election-how-colorado-
verifies-signatures-mail-ballots/5938295002/ [https://perma.cc/Q7P2-QVTZ] (describing the 
signature verification process). 
 65. For a description of Risk-Limiting Audits and their value in promoting public 
assurance that election outcomes are correct, see Appel & Stark, supra note 51, at 530–34 
(describing efforts to ensure that voting processes are verifiable and describing the 
risk-limiting audit process in detail). 
 66. See Accountability in Colorado Elections, COLO. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/ACE/index.html [https://perma.cc/F3SK-FXF5] 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
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Mismatch problems were not the only impediment to effective election 
observation in 2020.  The next part explores how technology-enhanced 
election transparency mechanisms can undermine, instead of enhance, public 
confidence in elections. 
B.  Transparency Misfires 
In numerous instances, election officials responded to COVID-19 
restrictions by leveraging technology to help the public see that elections 
were fairly run.  For example, Arkansas Governor Asa Hutchison issued an 
executive order on August 7, 2020, encouraging county election officials to 
livestream the processing, canvassing, and counting of absentee ballot 
envelopes online for remote observation.67  In July 2020, Vermont’s 
secretary of state issued guidance requiring that, if in-person election 
observation was impossible in November due to COVID-19 restrictions, “the 
process may be live-streamed . . . to allow for remote viewing, or may be 
recorded.”68 
The use of livestreaming to promote transparency in elections has been a 
long-standing practice in many jurisdictions around the country.69  An early, 
widely praised example occurred during the Franken-Coleman recount in 
Minnesota in 2008.  As the canvassing board reviewed contested absentee 
ballots in that recount, anyone with an internet connection could examine 
livestreamed ballots from their kitchen table along with election judges.70 
Yet, just when livestreaming of election processes might have saved the 
day, ensuring public oversight of an election fraught with COVID-19 
restrictions, today’s dysfunctional information environment knocked the legs 
out from underneath it.71  In several high-profile instances, livestreaming 
election processes fed massive conspiracy theories, ultimately undermining 
public trust.  In Delaware County, Pennsylvania, for example, election 
workers undertook a routine practice of duplicating ballots that scanners 
 
 67. Ark. Exec. Order No. 20-44 (Aug. 7, 2020). 
 68. STATE OF VERMONT:  OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, FIRST STATEWIDE 
ELECTIONS DIRECTIVE (2020). 
 69. See, e.g., ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-621(D) (2021) (“For any statewide, county 
or legislative election, the county recorder or officer in charge of elections shall provide for a 
live video recording of the custody of all ballots while the ballots are present in a tabulation 
room in the counting center.  The live video recording shall include date and time indicators 
and shall be linked to the secretary of state's website.  The secretary of state shall post links to 
the video coverage for viewing by the public.”). 
 70. See, e.g., Marisa Helms, Political Junkies Flock to Live Streaming of Senate Recount 
Proceedings, MINNPOST (Dec. 22, 2008), https://www.minnpost.com/politics-
policy/2008/12/political-junkies-flock-live-streaming-senate-recount-proceedings/ 
[https://perma.cc/RZ9M-2JDM] (describing how thousands tuned in to the canvassing 
livestream and noting that “a lot of [viewers] are saying they think [the recount] is incredibly 
honest, fair and transparent” as a result of the livestream (second alteration in original)). 
 71. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA:  MANIPULATION, 
DISINFORMATION, AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS (2018); see also Nathaniel 
Persily, The 2016 U.S. Election:  Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 63, 
63–76 (2017). 
2021] ELECTION OBSERVATION POST-2020 481 
rejected to ensure those otherwise valid votes counted.72  Election officials 
took pains to provide transparency by livestreaming the process to ensure 
voters that nothing was amiss.73  Yet, what the public saw on the livestream 
feed was election officials appearing to illegally mark ballots.  That, of 
course, fed conspiracy theories, which Delaware County immediately sought 
to counteract.74  But the damage had already been done. 
The 2020 election supplied numerous examples of this phenomenon.75  
Despite best intentions, technology-enhanced measures to improve 
transparency and public trust very often produced the exact opposite result:  
whether it was video feed of boxes being unloading off trucks76 or supposed 
suitcases of ballots under cloth-covered tables,77 such efforts fed, rather than 
quelled, the conspiracy machine. 
Part of the problem in 2020 was the toxic nature of partisanship this 
country continues to experience.  Multiple factors, including assumed bad 
faith of one’s political opponents, distrust of government actors, an inability 
to agree on the existence of facts, and malicious interference by actors foreign 
and domestic, makes the goal of running a smooth election particularly 
fraught.78  These challenges also undermine traditional mainstays of 
transparency as a means of ensuring public confidence in election outcomes.  
In the old days, a picture was worth a thousand words; today, a picture breeds 
a thousand conspiracies. 
 
 72. Ballot duplication is the process for replacing damaged or improperly marked 
ballots—when the voting system cannot read the ballot—with a new ballot that preserves the 
voter’s intent. See generally Michelle Shafer, Ballot Duplication:  What It Is, What It Is Not 
and Why We Are Talking About It in 2020, OVERSEAS VOTING INITIATIVE (July 20, 2020), 
https://ovi.csg.org/ballot-duplication-what-it-is-what-it-is-not-and-why-we-are-talking-
about-it-in-2020/ [https://perma.cc/T6AU-RDNF]. 
 73. Press Release, Delaware Cnty., Pa., Delaware County’s Response to Video 
Circulating of Ballots (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.delcopa.gov/publicrelations/ 
releases/2020/ballotvideoresponse.html [https://perma.cc/Q22H-UVXD] (describing efforts 
to livestream vote counting). 
 74. Id. (refuting claims that election officials were marking blank ballots when instead 
they were engaged in the routine process of ballot duplication). 
 75. Tanya Basu, Vote Count Livestreams Are Here to Stay, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 4, 
2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/11/04/1011648/livestream-vote-counts-are-
here-to-stay/ [https://perma.cc/F6BG-VPL3] (describing widespread use of livestreaming in 
the 2020 election and predicting its continued use in 2022 and beyond); see also David Levine, 
Trust but Verify:  Increasing Confidence in Democratic Elections, GEO. WASH. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y BRIEF (Mar. 5, 2021), https://studentbriefs.law.gwu.edu/ilpb/2021/03/05/trust-but-
verify-increasing-confidence-in-democratic-elections/ [https://perma.cc/G2DR-5M2L] 
(describing livestream practices in 2020 in the United States and internationally). 
 76. Marisa Iati & Adriana Usero, A Viral Video Implied a Man Was Illegally Moving 
Ballots.  It Was a Photographer and His Equipment, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/11/05/video-claiming-detroit-ballot-
fraud-debunked/ [https://perma.cc/5B37-B2BZ]. 
 77. Ali Swenson, Surveillance Tape Breeds False Fraud Claims in Georgia, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Dec. 4, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-donald-trump-georgia-media-
social-media-e9a73462e39e7aa39683f0f582a6659e [https://perma.cc/2D4V-ZXVH] 
(debunking claims of “suitcases filled with ballots” hidden under a cloth-covered table and 
tallied without supervision in Georgia). 
 78. See generally Persily, supra note 71 (describing the ills that plague modern 
democracy). 
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Counteracting misinformation and disinformation in elections presents a 
far bigger—and in ways existential—challenge to democratic functioning 
than election observer reform can hope to address.  Yet, it is important to 
consider how observation mechanisms play a role both in perpetuating 
misinformation and disinformation and potentially quelling it.  We learned 
in 2020 that livestreaming election processes is not the easy fix that some 
hoped it would be.  Despite this, as discussed further below in Part III, 
thoughtful use of technology can and should be leveraged to augment 
oversight. 
C.  Lack of Uniformity 
A final shortcoming of current election observation rules and practices is 
their lack of uniformity.  The existence of different laws in different states, 
and even different observation rules and practices within the same state, feeds 
public mistrust.79  Different jurisdictions with different rules relating to who 
can observe and what observers may do may create barriers to entry for 
people to engage in observation.  It also serves the narrative of election 
administrators hiding something:  why all these different, complicated, and 
often confusing rules? 
Variation in election observation policies between states is profound.  
Some states are quite permissive, allowing any member of the public to 
observe.80  Other states are restrictive, requiring individuals to be formally 
appointed to observe well in advance of elections (usually by candidates or 
political parties).81  Some states require observers to wear identification 
badges.82  Some states require that observers be registered voters in the state; 
 
 79. Local jurisdictions’ polling places and ballot processing layouts are never 
one-size-fits-all.  In Douglas County, Colorado, for example, ballot processing takes place in 
the basement of the elections office. Conversation with Judd Choate, supra note 27.  Local 
administrators fashioned a glass-walled observation booth that runs down the center of the 
operation, allowing observers to view the various election activities underway. Id.  Twenty 
miles away, in Denver, the election office that processes ballots consists of a series of rooms, 
each of which observers can enter, allowing observers to look over the shoulders of election 
workers in a way not possible in Douglas County. Id.  Both comply with Colorado law but 
take different approaches to enable observation. Id. 
 80. See, e.g., 17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-19-22 (2021) (“The conduct of elections is open to 
the public.”); MINN. STAT. § 204C.19 subdiv. 1 (2021) (requiring that counting be open to 
public). 
 81. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-45(a) (2021) (“Not more than two observers from 
the same political party shall be permitted in the voting enclosure at any time, except that in 
addition one of the at-large observers from each party may also be in the voting enclosure.”); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.315(3) (West 2021) (“The county executive committee of any 
political party having a ticket to elect at any regular or special election may designate not more 
than two (2) challengers to be present at and witness the holding of the election in each precinct 
in the county.”). 
 82. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-860 (2021). 
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some states require observers to be registered voters in the precinct in which 
they wish to observe.83  Other states have no residency restrictions.84 
Of course, state variation in election laws is a mainstay of U.S. elections.85  
In some instances, decentralized elections have proven to be a feature not a 
bug.  Decentralized election systems were widely touted in 2016, for 
example, as a main reason why U.S. elections could not be easily hacked.86  
Indeed, election observer rules lack uniformity in large part because of the 
wide divergence in how states run elections.  Election observation rules that 
work in one state may not work in another state since every state’s elections 
process is different, sometimes even varying from one county to the next.87  
Too much standardization might also disrupt long-standing state traditions, 
leading to greater mistrust among those familiar with past practice.  People 
within a state may have faith in how their elections are run because the same 
observer practices have been in place for decades.  Change, in this way, can 
be antithetical to securing public trust in election outcomes. 
Despite these concerns, we live in a world of instantaneous information 
dissemination where state borders often seem irrelevant during elections.88  
In presidential election years particularly, nationwide attention is routinely 
transfixed on elections in only a handful of swing states.89  This translates to 
swing states being flooded with out-of-state onlookers, who may be 
unfamiliar with local observer law, practices, and norms.  Out-of-state 
 
 83. See infra note 124 (listing state statutes that confine election observation residents of 
either state or jurisdiction in which they seek to observe). 
 84. For an example of a state that does not require observers to be residents of the state, 
see, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 21-A § 1 (2021). 
 85. See generally Landau et al., supra note 14 (noting the benefits of decentralization of 
authority over elections). 
 86. Drew Marvel, Protecting the States from Electoral Invasions, 28 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 197, 200 (2019) (citing Chris Good, When It Comes to Election Cybersecurity, 
Decentralized System Is Viewed as Both Blessing and Curse, ABC NEWS (Oct. 31, 2018, 
1:20 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/election-cybersecurity-decentralized-system-
viewed-blessing-curse/story?id=58877082 [https://perma.cc/X59B-S89P] (noting that 
“elections [are] overseen by about 10,000 different voting jurisdictions across the 50 states”)). 
 87. See supra note 79 (contrasting observation in Douglas County with observation in 
Denver). 
 88. Dan Balz, Think All Politics Are Local?:  The California Recall Says Most Politics 
Are Now National, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2021, 12:28 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/take-california-recall-
election/2021/09/18/dcfdece2-182c-11ec-9589-31ac3173c2e5_story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
77FT-5BLZ] (“It may be time to revisit the old axiom from Tip O’Neill, the former 
Democratic House speaker from Massachusetts, who famously said that all politics are local.  
These days . . . most politics are national.”). 
 89. This has been a long-standing phenomenon, particularly since Florida played a pivotal 
role in the 2000 election. Les Kjos, Analysis:  Lawyers Flock to Florida, UNITED PRESS INT’L 
(Oct. 25, 2004, 3:48 PM), https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2004/10/25/Analysis-
Lawyers-flock-to-Florida/31021098733728/ [https://perma.cc/PZM2-HGV7] (describing the 
influx of poll watchers from out of state, which prompted the president of the Florida State 
Association of Supervisors of Elections to send a letter to Governor Jeb Bush during the 2004 
presidential election complaining of being “‘bombarded with phone correspondence from the 
voters because of the harassment they’re enduring’ at polling locations . . . .”). 
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onlookers may hold expectations about how elections are run and how 
observers participate based on practices in their home states. 
In this environment, wide variance in observer rules breeds unfortunate 
confusion.  It raises barriers of entry to those who would observe elections at 
a time when citizen engagement could help; it undermines the public trust 
that these statutes are meant to secure.  While standardization may not be 
possible (or desirable), as discussed in Part III below, it may be that the 
federal government has a role to play in setting a floor for basic features of 
election observation. 
II.  POST-2020 ELECTION OBSERVATION REFORM 
Despite wide consensus among election administrators (and judges) that 
the 2020 election was one of the most well-run, fair, and transparent elections 
in U.S. history,90 an alarming number of Americans lack faith in its outcome 
even months after President Joe Biden was inaugurated.91  Widespread 
dissatisfaction with the administration of the 2020 election was bipartisan.  
On the left, many believe barriers to voting prevented eligible voters from 
casting ballots.  On the right are concerns—without evidence—that millions 
of ineligible voters skewed the outcome.  Amidst these stark divisions, 
legislatures around the country are pursuing election reforms.92 
Legislatures in over twenty states have trained at least part of their election 
reform energies on observer statutes.  Some reform proposals address the 
shortcomings identified herein.  Several proposed reforms seek to ensure that 
 
 90. NAT’L TASK FORCE ON ELECTION CRISES, STRENGTHENING OUR ELECTIONS AND 
PREVENTING ELECTION CRISES:  LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE 2020 GENERAL 
ELECTION (2021), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e70e52c7c72720ed714313f/t/ 
600192b45103a7521617d636/1610715829231/ElectionTF-Report_2021.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6TFX-V7UF] (assessing the November 2020 election and concluding that 
despite multiple opportunities for improvement and reform, the “2020 election had the highest 
turnout in American history, with nearly 160 million votes cast”).  The report further found 
that “multiple independent bodies, including the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency (CISA), Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the 
Organization of American States (OAS), the Harvard Electoral Integrity Project (EIP), as well 
as election officials in dozens of states determined that the election was secure and free of 
widespread irregularities.”  Id. 
 91. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 92. Doubt surrounding the outcome of the 2020 election inspired the Arizona legislature 
to conduct its own partisan review of ballots from the 2020 presidential and U.S. Senate races 
in Arizona, a worrisome trend that other states are imitating. See Amy Gardner, In Echo of 
Arizona, Georgia State Judge Orders Fulton County to Allow Local Voters to Inspect Mailed 
Ballots Cast Last Fall, WASH. POST (May 21, 2021, 6:40 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/georgia-ballot-inspection/2021/05/21/1e8ad1cc-
ba61-11eb-a6b1-81296da0339b_story.html [https://perma.cc/6R34-T2LW]; David A. 
Graham, The Unfolding Disaster in Arizona:  The Question Isn’t Whether It Can End Well, 
But How Exactly It Will End Badly, ATLANTIC (May 7, 2021), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/05/arizonas-election-audit-is-a-
trainwreck/618834/ [https://perma.cc/3U8F-QQFW]; Nathan Layne, Pennsylvania 
Republicans Launch Election Audit, Solicit Testimony on ‘Improprieties,’ REUTERS  
(Sept. 3, 2021, 4:59 AM), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/pennsylvania-republicans-
launch-election-audit-solicit-testimony-improprieties-2021-09-03/ [https://perma.cc/Y5Z9-
XBSH]. 
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election observers are given meaningful access to perform their role—for 
example, allowing observers to stand physically close enough to election 
officials and voters to “see and hear” their activities (making exceptions, of 
course, for ballot secrecy).93  The Georgia legislature, for example, added 
language to its election code requiring that poll watchers be allowed to “fairly 
observe” election procedures at ballot tabulation centers.94 
Other bills address the mismatch problem.  The Montana legislature passed 
a bill that gives watchers permission to be present at all ballot drop-off 
locations.95  The New Hampshire State Senate passed a bill that gives 
observers the right to observe the processes of opening ballot envelopes and 
reviewing voter affidavits.96  New York passed legislation that allows 
watchers to be present at meetings where absentee ballots are being 
processed.97  Bills that address the mismatch problem are needed and should 
be lauded. 
Election observer training is also rightfully on legislators’ radar.  Georgia’s 
new election statute requires that poll watchers be trained to ensure they 
know their duties and state election laws.98  The Georgia law delegates to 
 
 93. See, e.g., S.B. 210, 105th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2021); S.B. 1611, 87th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Tex. 2021) (providing observers permission to stand close enough to “see and hear” 
voters’ and election officials’ activities—provided that watchers cannot enter the voting 
booth—and preventing watchers from being denied “free movement” at polling places).  Note 
that several courts have declined to hold that a lack of meaningful access invalidates an 
election. See, e.g., Benavente v. Taitano, 2006 Guam 16, 20 (holding that poll watchers being 
improperly denied access to polls as prescribed by law does not automatically provide the 
basis for a new election to be called); Conroy v. Levine, 100 A.D.2d 918, 919 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1984) (finding that losing candidates’ poll watchers being improperly denied access to the 
polls did not provide basis for new election because the candidate could have sought 
appropriate judicial relief on election day); Menssen v. Eureka Unit Dist. No. 140, Woodford 
Cty., 388 N.E.2d 273, 277 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (declining to invalidate election challenged on 
the grounds that the public was not present to observe counting of absentee ballots and holding 
that the election could only be invalidated if poll watchers were systematically excluded from 
the polls). 
 94. S.B. 202, 2021–2022 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2021).  Georgia’s legislation 
added the following italicized language to its poll watcher statute:  “Such designated locations 
shall include the check-in area, the computer room, the duplication area, and such other areas 
as the superintendent may deem necessary to the assurance of fair and honest procedures in 
the tabulating center.  The locations designated by the superintendent shall ensure that each 
poll watcher can fairly observe the procedures set forth in this Code section.  The poll 
watchers provided for in this subsection shall be appointed and serve in the same manner as 
other poll watchers.”  GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-408(c) (2021) (emphasis added). 
 95. S.B. 93, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021). 
 96. S.B. 89, 2021 Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2021). 
 97. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 9-209 (McKinney 2021) (effective Jan 1, 2023).  Oregon 
considered, but ultimately failed to pass, a bill requiring that observers be present when 
absentee ballots are printed and placed in envelopes to be mailed to voters. S.B. 824, 81st Leg. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2021). 
 98. S.B. 202, 2021–2022 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 32 (Ga. 2021) (“No person shall be 
eligible to serve as a poll watcher unless he or she has completed training provided by the 
political party, political body, or candidate designating the poll watcher.  Upon request, the 
Secretary of State shall make available material to each political party, political body, or 
candidate that can be utilized in such training but it shall be the responsibility of the political 
party, political body, or candidate designating the poll watcher to instruct poll watchers in 
their duties and in applicable laws and rules and regulations.  Each political party, political 
486 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
candidates and political parties the job of conducting training, although it 
does require the secretary of state to make training materials available for 
this purpose.99  Done correctly, careful and detailed observer training can go 
a long way in contextualizing what observers see and curbing the negative 
effects of transparency.100  If, for example, observers understood the ballot 
duplication process and its many protections, the unwarranted and misguided 
accusations levied in 2020 might have been quelled.  Training and education, 
as explored further in Part III, are essential.101 
Reforms that seek more meaningful access for observers, that address the 
mismatch problem, and that seek to educate observers about the election 
process and their role in it, are healthy legislative reactions to the current 
environment of widespread mistrust.  Other election observation reform 
proposals are worrisome.  Problematic legislative proposals fall into three 
categories:  (1) bills that allow observers to use devices to record election 
processes, (2) legislation that imposes criminal penalties on election officials 
for obstructing election observers, and (3) reforms that remove state 
residency requirements for observers. 
Following the 2020 election, legislatures around the country introduced 
bills to allow election observers to record what they see.  So far, none 
advanced.  An Illinois bill would have required all poll watchers in the state 
to wear body cameras.102  A Michigan bill would have allowed watchers to 
use devices to record vote tabulation and would make it a misdemeanor to 
impede election observers from recording the tabulation process.103  The 
Texas legislature advanced, but ultimately scuttled, bills that would give 
watchers authority to take pictures and record video in polling locations, 
 
body, or candidate shall, in their written designation of poll watchers, certify under oath that 
the named poll watchers have completed the training required by this Code section.”). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Jocelyn Benson, When Poll-Watching Crosses the Line, POLITICO (Aug. 25, 2016), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/08/poll-election-monitor-challengers-vote-
laws-watchers-214189/ [https://perma.cc/3KX8-7L5A] (advocating that states “mandate that 
all election monitors complete a detailed and comprehensive statewide training program that 
requires them to demonstrate a sufficient and accurate understanding of the laws governing 
elections in their state”). 
 101. Other states are considering training requirements for challengers. See, e.g., H.B. 
4528, 101st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2021) (requiring challengers to undertake “comprehensive 
training” at least twenty days before each primary, general, or special election). 
 102. H.B. 3553, 102d Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2021). 
 103. S.B. 276, 101st Leg. (Mich. 2021).  In a nod to voter privacy, Michigan’s bill would 
make it a misdemeanor for watchers to photograph or record a voter entering, leaving, or 
voting at a polling place or a voter’s identification. Id.; see Nick Corasaniti, G.O.P. Seeks to 
Empower Poll Watchers, Raising Intimidation Worries, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/01/us/politics/republican-pollwatchers.html 
[https://perma.cc/6F7P-WRS3] (describing efforts to allow poll watchers to record). 
2021] ELECTION OBSERVATION POST-2020 487 
including of voters.104  Current Texas law prohibits election observers from 
carrying devices to record sound and images at the polls.105 
Many existing state statutes and secretary of state guidance prohibit 
observers from recording or taking pictures in polling places.106  Challenges 
 
 104. Nick Corasaniti, Texas Senate Passes One of the Nation’s Strictest Voting Bills,  
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/29/us/politics/texas-voting-
bill.html [https://perma.cc/NYM8-AYN5] (noting that “lawmakers dropped some of the most 
stringent [provisions], like . . . a measure that would have permitted partisan poll watchers to 
record the voting process on video”).  Proposals would have allowed watchers to submit 
photos, video, or audio recordings of activity they believe to be unlawful to the secretary of 
state.  A related Texas bill would have allowed watchers to record video or audio during the 
vote tabulation process. See Sweren-Becker, supra note 16. 
 105. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 3.33.051(c) (West 2021) (“A watcher may not be accepted 
for service if the watcher has possession of a device capable of recording images or sound 
unless the watcher agrees to disable or deactivate the device.”).  Texas’s poll watcher guide 
similarly prohibits watchers from “[u]sing a wireless communication device within 100 feet 
of polling place . . . .” TEX. SEC’Y STATE ELECTIONS DIV., POLL WATCHER’S GUIDE, 
§§ 33.052(b), 61.014 (2019), https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/forms/pollwatchers-
guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9QR-3J5U]. 
 106. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-515(G) (2021) (prohibiting photos or videos 
within seventy-five feet of a voting location); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18541 (West 2021) 
(specifying that, in the voter intimidation context, “no person shall . . . [p]hotograph, video 
record, or otherwise record a voter . . . .”); COLO. CODE REGS. § 1505-1, r. 15.7 (2021) 
(specifying observers may not “[u]se any electronic device to take or record pictures, video, 
or audio in any polling location or other place election activities are conducted”); Notice of 
Emergency and Proposed Rulemaking (D.C. Sept. 22, 2020) (to be codified at D.C. Mun. 
Regs. tit. 3 § 706.17(f)); MICH. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF ELECS., THE APPOINTMENT, 
RIGHTS, AND DUTIES OF ELECTION CHALLENGERS AND POLL WATCHERS (2020), 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/SOS_ED_2_CHALLENGERS_77017_7.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y9ZQ-8JM7] (stating that challengers and poll watchers may not “use a 
video camera or recording device, or the camera or recording features of a smart phone or 
tablet in polling place or clerk’s office”); Minn. Sec’y of State, Polling Place Rules, 
https://www.sos.state.mn.us/elections-voting/election-day-voting/polling-place-rules/ 
[https://perma.cc/9MQM-VP2K] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021) (“discourag[ing]” taking 
photos); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-577(c)–(d) (2021) (noting that poll watchers are prohibited 
from viewing or photographing pollbooks while at polling place or photographing receipt 
books while at polling place); MONT. SEC’Y OF STATE, ELECTION JUDGE HANDBOOK (2020), 
https://sosmt.gov/Portals/142/Elections/Documents/Officials/Election-Judge-Handbook.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4QGW-PPMB] (delegating decision to local election officials); OHIO SEC’Y 
OF STATE, ELECTION DAY VOTING DIRECTIVE 2016–23, at 7–26 (2016), 
https://elections.bcohio.gov/dir2016-23_eom-ch_07.pdf [https://perma.cc/XW5Q-5BUD] 
(prohibiting observer use of recording devices); S.D. SEC’Y OF STATE, POLL WATCHER  
AND OBSERVER GUIDELINES (2021), https://sdsos.gov/elections-voting/assets/ 
PollWatcherObserverGuidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/UR6L-5QWG] (stating that observers 
may not “[u]se any communication or photographic device in any manner which repeatedly 
distracts, interrupts or intimidates any voter or election worker . . . [or u]se any 
communication, photographic or video device to take video or pictures of the pollbook”); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-104(e) (2021) (“Poll watchers observing the duties of the absentee 
counting board are prohibited from possessing any electronic device, including a cellular 
telephone or pager, capable of transmitting election results to a location outside the room 
where the ballots are being tabulated.”); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 33.051(c) (2021) (“A 
watcher may not . . . ha[ve] possession of a device capable of recording images or sound 
unless the watcher agrees to disable or deactivate the device.”); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 20A-3a-801(5)(a)(i) (West 2021) (stating that an observer may not “electronically record an 
activity . . . if the recording would reveal a vote or otherwise violate a voter’s privacy or a 
voter’s right to cast a secret ballot”); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-604.4(D) (West 2021) 
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to prohibitions of photographing or recording in polling places have been 
unsuccessful.107  Perhaps courts recognize the danger of enabling recording 
in polling places, fearing eligible voters might shy away from the polls if they 
knew partisan observers would photograph and video record them?108  
Another concern is whether such recordings would be manipulated or 
presented out of context in ways that would jeopardize free and fair 
elections.109  In the context of policing, police body cameras and bystander 
cell phone videos are providing an important check on police power, albeit 
with concerning side effects.110 
Courts are just starting to come to terms with whether laws prohibiting 
members of the public from recording what they see and hear in places they 
are legally allowed to be violate the First Amendment.111  So far, courts of 
appeals are united on the right to record police interactions.112  But elections 
are fundamentally different from police interactions.113  Recognizing this, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has limited First Amendment protections in and 
 
(“Authorized representatives shall be allowed, whether in a regular polling place or central 
absentee voter precinct, to use a handheld wireless communications device but shall not be 
allowed to use such a device to capture a digital image inside the polling place or central 
absentee voter precinct.”). 
 107. See, e.g., Poniktera v. Seiler, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 121, 136–38 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding 
that a regulation prohibiting photography and video in polling places represented a reasonable 
accommodation of voters’ desire to cast a secret ballot and did not infringe on the poll 
watcher’s constitutional rights). 
 108. In at least one instance, an allegation of voter intimidation due to a poll watcher’s use 
of cameras failed to move a court to issue an injunction. See Ariz. Democratic Party v. Ariz. 
Republican Party, No. CV-16-03752, 2016 WL 8669978, at *13 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2016) 
(holding that political party poll watcher training that encouraged poll watchers to follow 
people suspected of fraud outside of the seventy-five foot radius to photograph them did not 
violate an Arizona statute prohibiting photography by poll watchers within seventy-five feet 
of polls and did not merit an injunction due to lack of evidence that voters would be 
intimidated). 
 109. See Corasaniti, supra note 103. 
 110. See generally Jeffrey Bellin & Shevarma Pemberton, Policing the Admissibility of 
Body Camera Evidence, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1425 (2019) (describing the manipulation of 
body camera footage through police narration). 
 111. See generally Margot E. Kaminksi, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. REV. 
167 (2017) (describing the boundaries of the right to record). 
 112. See Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 355–56 (3d Cir. 2017); Turner v. 
Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 689 (5th Cir. 2017); Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ill. v. 
Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595–600, 608 (7th Cir. 2012).  See generally Aidan J. Coleman & 
Katharine M. Janes, Comment, Caught on Tape:  Establishing the Right of Third-Party 
Bystanders to Secretly Record the Police, 107 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 166, 168 (2021) (noting 
that “[f]ederal appellate courts across the country have consistently recognized the existence 
of a valid First Amendment right in recording the police in public spaces”). 
 113. See Rebecca Green, Election Surveillance, 57 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 
2022) (describing the dangers of surveillance tactics in elections).  The counterargument is 
that prohibiting election observers from recording what they see forces observers to rely on 
“second best” evidence when reporting irregularities to those running elections.  This evidence 
might prove crucial to ensuring observer credibility in raising concerns.  One might argue that 
aside from secret ballot concerns, voter privacy in and around polling places should not 
outweigh transparency and election integrity concerns.  As Justice Antonin Scalia argued, 
democracy takes courage. Doe v. Reed, Wash. Sec’y of State, 561 U.S. 186, 228 (2010) 
(“Requiring people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic courage, without 
which democracy is doomed.”). 
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around polling places, citing the “substantial consensus . . .  that some 
restricted zone around polling places is necessary to” protect the right to 
vote.114 
The fear that overly aggressive election observers will intimidate voters 
and do damage to the democratic process is hardly unfounded.  This country 
has a long, sad history of racialized voter intimidation that continues to this 
day, including, and especially exacerbated by, those on a “ballot security” 
mission to preserve election integrity or (more ominously) the “purity” of 
elections.115 
This history gives the next problematic set of proposals an even more 
worrisome overlay:  post-2020 legislation imposing criminal penalties on 
election officials who obstruct election observers or refuse to allow them to 
enter polling places or other venues where election processes are taking 
place.  Iowa has passed such a statute,116 as has Texas.117  Texas’s new law 
additionally empowers poll watchers to seek court orders against election 
officials who “get in their way.”118 
 
 114. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992). 
 115. See Hannah Knowles, A Texas Bill Drew Ire for Saying It Would Preserve ‘Purity of 
the Ballot Box.’  Here’s the Phrase’s History, WASH. POST (May 9, 2021, 3:02 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2021/05/09/texas-purity-ballot-box-black/ 
[https://perma.cc/XV47-9K8Z] (describing the history of the term); see also Joseph Tanfani 
& Jarrett Renshaw, Challengers, Observers and Electioneering:  The History and Rules of 
U.S. Poll Watching, REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2020, 6:11 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-election-poll-watchers-facts-expl/challengers-observers-and-electioneering-the-history-
and-rules-of-u-s-poll-watching-idUSKBN26S1IH [https://perma.cc/A2FD-WCK2].  Perhaps 
the most infamous example of election observation running amok occurred at the hands of the 
Republican Party’s National Ballot Security Task Force in New Jersey in 1981.  Abuses 
resulted in a consent decree imposed by a federal court requiring the Republican Party to allow 
a federal court to review proposed “ballot security” programs. See Consent Decree, 
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., No. 2:81-cv-03876 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 
1982); see also Corasaniti, supra note 103. 
 116. S.F. 413, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2021). 
 117. Nick Corasaniti, Abbott Signs Texas Election Law, Ending a Fierce Voting Rights 
Battle, N.Y TIMES (Sept. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/07/us/politics/greg-
abbott-texas-voting-rights-law.html [https://perma.cc/HS63-ADA8] (noting that the law 
greatly empowers poll watchers); H.B. 6, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021) (creating a 
criminal offense for an election official to distance or obstruct the view of a watcher if it makes 
the watcher’s observation ineffective or to refuse to accept the required service of a watcher 
at a polling location or counting location); H.B. 4364, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021) 
(creating a misdemeanor for an election official to intentionally or knowingly refuse to accept 
the required service of a watcher in a polling location or counting location); S.B. 7, 87th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021) (creating a criminal offense for an election official to distance or 
obstruct the view of a watcher if it makes the watcher’s observation ineffective, making it a 
misdemeanor for an election official to refuse to accept the required service of a watcher in a 
polling or counting location and allowing watchers to file suit seeking an injunction to obtain 
access to a polling location or ballot counting or processing location). 
 118. Acacia Coronado & Nicholas Riccardi, AP Explains:  How Texas Law Makes Voting 
Harder, NBC DFW (Sept. 9, 2021, 4:41 PM), https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/texas-
news/ap-explainer-how-texas-law-makes-voting-harder/2736064/ [https://perma.cc/RY4G-
U95L].  The Texas law also gives poll watchers more latitude since they can only be removed 
from duty for violating an election law if that violation is witnessed by an election clerk or 
judge. Id. 
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Criminalizing the actions of election officials, the vast majority of whom 
are temporary workers engaged in a critical act of public service,119 is risky. 
Election officials are charged with maintaining an orderly process during 
elections and ensuring that all eligible voters can cast their ballots free from 
intimidation.  Subjecting election workers to criminal penalties at the whim 
of charged partisan actors is a recipe for not only a massive shortage of 
people willing to serve as poll workers but also disruptive and confrontational 
election environments.120 
A mix of allowing observers to record election processes and removing 
election officials’ ability to rein in bad behavior on the part of observers is 
concerning.  Consider events surrounding a runoff election in Anchorage, 
Alaska in May 2021: 
Citizen observers in Anchorage crowded outside the Election Center, 
photographing workers and writing down their license plate numbers.  
Inside, they filed challenge after challenge to routine counting procedures.  
At times, the observers grew openly hostile.  Several officials were 
“accosted” in the parking lot, according to the Anchorage City Clerk’s 
Office.  Threats poured in via email, with one announcing that election 
officials “should be publicly executed.”121 
 
 119. Election Poll Workers, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 17, 2020), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/election-poll-
workers637018267.aspx [https://perma.cc/FST2-YBE2] (noting that “[m]ost . . . poll workers 
are part-time, temporary employees hired by local election officials to staff polling places 
during early voting and on Election Day”). 
 120. The poll worker shortage in the United States is already pronounced, leading to 
pandemic-exacerbated fears of poll worker shortages in 2020. See, e.g., Editorial Board, 
America’s Poll Worker Shortage Is a Brewing Crisis, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 2, 2020, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-09-02/election-2020-poll-worker-
shortage-could-create-a-crisis-for-voters [https://perma.cc/MQS5-XPVY].  Notably, this 
legislative inclination—reforms aimed at diminishing the power of election officials—ties into 
a larger post-2020 trend Professor Richard Hasen has dubbed “election subversion.” Richard 
L. Hasen, Identifying and Minimizing the Risk of Election Subversion and Stolen Elections in 
the Contemporary United States, 135 HARV. L. REV. F. (forthcoming 2022) (describing the 
“election subversion” trend).  Criminalizing the actions of election officials is not new and is 
even part of the federal code. See 52 U.S.C. § 20511 (imposing criminal penalties for a variety 
of election offenses on “[a] person, including an election official, . . . in any election for 
Federal office”).  Likewise, state laws have long featured criminal penalties for election 
official malfeasance.  For example, a 1955 Michigan law still on the books imposes criminal 
penalties on election officials that “prevent the presence of any such [observer] . . . or shall 
refuse or fail to provide such [observer] with conveniences for the performance of the duties 
expected of him.” See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.734 (1955).  Several other states have had 
such laws on the books for decades. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5139 (2021); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 119.145, 119.225 (West 2021); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 17-106 (McKinney 
2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.19(A)(13)–(14), (B) (West 2021).  Prosecution under 
these provisions appears to be exceedingly rare and none involve prosecution for interfering 
with observers. See, e.g., People v. Vreeland, 191 N.E. 579 (N.Y. 1934); People v. Spitzer, 
266 N.Y.S. 522 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (both involving intentional false statements regarding an 
election result). 
 121. Tim Elfrink, As GOP Candidate Used RV for 24/7 Watch, Anchorage Election Staff 
Say They Faced ‘Unprecedented Harassment,’ WASH. POST (May 28, 2021, 4:09 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/05/28/anchorage-election-harassment-
bronson-dunbar/ [https://perma.cc/4QH5-HDPR] (citing a clerk’s report after the election that 
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Citizen election surveillance has a dangerous dark side.122 
A final reform trend seeks to eliminate residency requirements allowing 
election observers who reside outside of a voting jurisdiction to observe 
election processes.123  It is understandable that residency restrictions would 
be eased.  As noted above, because U.S. presidential elections come down to 
a handful of states, nationwide focus on how elections in those states operate 
leads to out-of-towners seeking access as observers.  Being told “no” fuels 
mistrust.  Yet, as explored below in Part III, there are important and 
court-sanctioned reasons why residency requirements improve election 
observation that explain why many states impose them.124 
 
highlighted the damaging effect of a lack of observer understanding of election processes:  
“[i]t was apparent from the behavior and questions . . . that a number of observers had not 
been trained by their campaign, many had not read the manual, and many did not have any 
understanding of the processes at the Election Center”). 
 122. See Green, supra note 113.  A similar pattern played out in the September 2021 recall 
election in California. See Paige St. John, Election Watchers Snap Photos of Workers, 
Challenge Voter Signatures as Recall Nears, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2021, 12:38 PM), 
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-09-10/election-chiefs-wary-of-california-
recall-vote-fraud-claims [https://perma.cc/XF87-882R] (describing the efforts of volunteers 
with the Election Integrity Project in California’s recall and noting “election workers arrive to 
pick up ballots from a county drop box outside of Leisure World and, no matter what time of 
day they make their rounds, [they] are invariably met by a man who pops out to take their 
picture).  “Other election workers report[ed] individuals photographing their license plates.” 
Id. 
 123. See, e.g., S.B. 656, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021) (failing to advance but allowing 
watchers to serve outside of their counties of residence if they were registered Florida voters 
and members of the Florida Bar); H.B. 738, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2021) 
(failing to pass but eliminating requirement that observer reside in the designated jurisdiction); 
S.B. 1535, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021) (eliminating requirement that watchers be 
residents of the precincts where they will serve, requiring instead that watchers be registered 
voters of the territories served by a polling place or other site). 
 124. The 2020 election featured bipartisan challenges to poll watcher residency 
requirements, none of which were successful. See Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. 
Boockvar, 493 F. Supp. 3d 331, 371 (W.D. Pa. 2020) (holding that Pennsylvania’s poll 
watcher residency requirements were designed to encourage familiarity of poll watchers with 
the location they operate in); Pennsylvania Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345, 390–
91 (Pa. 2020) (finding that poll watcher residency requirements do not violate fundamental 
constitutional rights); Bolus v. Boockvar, No. 20-CV-01882, 2020 WL 6880960, at *5 (M.D. 
Pa. Oct. 27, 2020) (holding that restricting poll watchers to their counties of residence is a 
rational basis for increasing familiarity between voters and poll watchers).  Before the 2020 
election, an Ohio court used a rational basis review to find that residency requirements were 
constitutional. See Republican Party of Pa. v. Cortes, 218 F. Supp. 3d 396, 409 (E.D. Pa. 2016) 
(“The legislature’s decision to allow county election officials to credential only poll watchers 
from their own county is rationally related to the state’s interest in maintaining its county-run 
election system.”).  In some states, observers must be registered voters from the state but can 
reside anywhere within the state. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-8-7 (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-
77 (2021); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/17-23 (West 2021); IOWA CODE § 49.104 (2021); 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:427 (2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-604.4 (2021).  Other states are more 
restrictive, requiring poll watchers to be registered voters in the jurisdiction in which they will 
observe. See FLA. STAT. § 101.131 (2021) (“Each poll watcher shall be a qualified and 
registered elector of the county in which he or she serves.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-2-22 (2021) 
(“[W]atchers shall be voters of a precinct located in that county to which they are appointed.”); 
N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 8-500 (McKinney 2021) (“Each watcher must be a qualified voter of the 
city or county in which he is to serve.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-45 (2021) (“Persons appointed 
as observers . . . must be registered voters of the county for which appointed and must have 
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As states consider election observation reform in this highly fraught 
political environment, they must tread carefully.  The next part offers a set of 
recommendations with this aim. 
III.  ELECTION OBSERVATION:  A PATH FORWARD 
Given current anxieties many Americans feel about how elections are 
administered and whether they produce accurate results,125 one solution is to 
increase civic engagement in the election process:  the more people who are 
actively involved in elections, the more the public will learn about the many 
procedural safeguards and protections in place to ensure the count is 
correct.126  Election observation practices should tap this energy but should 
also recognize the potential for election observation to do harm.  Bearing this 
balance in mind, this section suggests five basic principles to guide reform. 
A.  Address the Mismatch Problem 
For those that have not yet done so, states should update their observer 
statutes to account for how voting takes place.  Where applicable, states’ 
rules should provide meaningful access to observation at early voting sites 
and ensure that observer statutes account for voting centers and other 
consolidated election processes during voting and ballot tabulation.  Much 
will depend on how state election administration is structured.  Legislators 
should examine their state’s election processes from end to end and evaluate 
how to meaningfully incorporate observation at each phase.  In addition, 
states should plan election observation contingencies should disruptions—
like pandemic or weather-related disturbances—arise.127 
 
good moral character.”); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2687 (2021) (“Each watcher . . . must be a 
qualified registered elector of the county in which the election district for which the watcher 
was appointed is located.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-860 (2021) (“Each watcher appointed 
hereunder must be a qualified voter in the county where he is to watch . . . .”); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 22-15-109 (2021) (“A poll watcher shall belong to the political party he represents and 
shall be a registered elector residing in the county.”). 
 125. Americans feel anxiety about these issues despite the widespread assessment that the 
2020 election was among the most secure in modern history. See, e.g., Press Release, 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Joint Statement from Elections 
Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council & the Election Infrastructure Sector 
Coordinating Executive Committees (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.cisa.gov/news/2020/11/ 
12/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-election 
[https://perma.cc/C6NE-23ZU]. 
 126. In its report on voter confidence in election outcomes, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology researchers arrived at the depressing conclusion that the single greatest factor in 
determining whether voters have confidence in outcomes is whether their party or candidate 
won. See Voter Confidence, MIT ELECTION DATA + SCIENCE LAB (Apr. 2, 2021), 
https://electionlab.mit.edu/research/voter-confidence [https://perma.cc/G2ZR-RQTV].  But, 
aside from this finding, the researchers cite studies finding that direct experience with the 
voting process bolsters confidence in the outcome. Id.  They cite research suggesting that 
“voters tend to be more confident when they don’t wait a long time to vote, when they 
encounter polling place officials who seem competent, and when they vote in person rather 
than by mail.” Id. 
 127. See Erin Duffen, Share of Absentee Ballots Requested in Select States for the 2020 
Presidential Election in the United States, as a Share of 2016 Absentee Ballots, STATISTA 
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As states review where mismatches occur, the wisest states will include 
state and local election administrators as much as possible in crafting 
observer reform.  As the front line in election administration, election 
officials are in the best position to understand what observers clamor to see, 
what is most likely to impinge on an orderly process, and the best ways to 
make observation rules effective in practice.  Involving election officials in 
crafting rules for observers might also lessen election administrator hostility 
toward observers who may view observers as interlopers rather than a crucial 
component of well-run elections.  Whether it is involvement in the legislative 
process or authority in developing and implementing rules and policies, the 
experiences and knowledge of election administrators at the state and local 
levels should be at the forefront of reform. 
B.  Adopt “Contextualized Transparency” Mechanisms 
Throwing the floodgates open to government processes and data can be 
dangerous despite the best intentions.  Professor Lawrence Lessig identified 
this problem in 2009 in an article called Against Transparency.128  In it, he 
tells the story of surveillance cameras recording a blonde woman walking 
into an older man’s hotel room and the two leaving the room several hours 
later, leading viewers to jump to conclusions.129  The key piece of 
contextualized information:  the woman is the man’s daughter.130 
In the election context, as discussed above, transparency mechanisms can 
similarly backfire.131  Contextualized transparency—that is, ensuring that 
those who observe elections are provided context and trained to understand 
what they are seeing—is one way to combat transparency harms.  As one 
authority on election administration and verification recently put it: 
Transparency must illustrate the complexity of running elections and 
educate observers.  It cannot be merely theater or spectacle, especially 
when there are dangerous incentives for bad actors to engage in 
“transparency theater” or “election integrity theater.”132 
Contextualized transparency also involves election officials affirmatively 
pushing out election information to the public.  This should include 
everything from explainers on ballot casting and vote tabulation processes—
 
(Nov. 20, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1184283/presidential-election-absentee-
ballots-requested-share-2016-ballots-us/ [https://perma.cc/DC2X-E2C8]; see also CAO ET AL., 
supra note 34, at 3 (analyzing the 2020 primary, finding that “[v]oting at polling places 
decreased by 50% in 2020 from 2016.  Mail and absentee voting combined increased from 2% 
in 2016 to 50% in 2020”). 
 128. Lawrence Lessig, Against Transparency, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 9, 2009), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/books-and-arts/against-transparency 
[http://perma.cc/GW8B-W59X]. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See supra Part I.B. 
 132. Edward Perez, Glob. Dir. of Tech. Dev. & Open Standards for the OSET Inst., Carter 
Center Roundtable on How International Standards Can Support U.S. Elections (May 26, 
2021) (notes on file with author). 
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including details about the safeguards in place—to information about 
absentee ballots (e.g., how many are sent to voters, how many are returned, 
etc.) and to releasing voting machine data (e.g., serial numbers of voting 
machines, tallies at the beginning and end of the day).  Indeed, many states 
already require election officials to disclose such information.133  The more 
data and plain-English explanations state officials can provide about election 
administration, the better the public will (at least in theory) comprehend how 
secure and reliable elections are.134 
C.  Strengthen Structured Transparency Mechanisms 
Looking to history, our present circumstance is not the first time U.S. 
elections have confronted a crisis in confidence.  As historians like Richard 
McCormick describe, U.S. elections in the nineteenth century reached an 
unsustainable level of debauchery.135  At the time, states turned to a storied 
reform measure to restore order to the process:  the secret ballot.  But, the 
secret ballot was only one of many paradigm-shifting reforms legislatures 
pursued at the time.  State-printed ballots, moving polling locations to public 
buildings, and strict chain-of-custody statutes are a few examples of the ways 
in which reforms sought to professionalize and institutionalize election 
administration.136  As I explain in an earlier article on election transparency: 
Although states wrested control of most voting processes from political 
parties, reformers understood that transparency could not be eliminated.  
Political parties would be unwilling to cede power without mechanisms to 
confirm the other party had not committed fraud or otherwise stolen the 
vote.  Those unhappy with election outcomes would allege fraud, 
corruption, or official collusion in throwing the election if elections were 
conducted entirely out of view.  State legislatures therefore passed statutes 
giving explicit roles to party representatives in election processes.137 
This form of “structured transparency,” in which the state creates 
structured mechanisms for citizen election observation, is a central 
component of modern-day election administration, as described above.  
States adopted and continue to maintain defined processes for appointing 
 
 133. See supra note 62 (describing the Colorado Division of Election’s practices relating 
to releasing data and public information about elections); see also ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 7-5-416(a)(4) (2021) (requiring reporting of daily counts of absentee ballots); MD. CODE 
ANN. ELEC. LAW § 11-302(e) (West 2021) (“At the end of each day of canvassing, a local 
board shall prepare and release a report of the unofficial results of the absentee ballot vote 
tabulation.”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:1313.F (2021) (requiring election boards to release 
absentee and early votes after the polls close in a given parish). 
 134. See supra note 62. 
 135. See RICHARD P. MCCORMICK, THE HISTORY OF VOTING IN NEW JERSEY:  A STUDY OF 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTION MACHINERY 1664–1911, at 151–52 (1953). (“Scenes of 
drunkenness at the polls had become traditional.  Indeed, in a great many places voting still 
took place in a ‘hotel,’ which made resort to spirituous refreshment both convenient and 
tempting.”). 
 136. Green, supra note 24, at 788–90. 
 137. Id. at 788. 
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observers and detailed rules for how observers engage during the election 
process.138 
As U.S. election processes experience extreme duress today—this time 
due to an information environment that enables bad actors to actively 
undermine public faith in outcomes139—some proposed solutions could 
strengthen and update structured transparency efforts.  For example, the 
Council of State Governments (CSG) recommends that when election 
officials enable remote observation streamed online, those who wish to watch 
should be required to provide their name, address, and other information, and 
they should accept conditions and guidelines for remote observation.140  CSG 
points to one such process used in Orange County, California.141  This is a 
form of structured transparency configured for the digital age. 
A more basic structured transparency regime would:  (1) permit only 
candidate- or party-appointed poll watchers; (2) limit the number of poll 
watchers; (3) follow the lead of the many states with state residency 
requirements for observers; (4) require observers to wear ID badges; (5) 
provide structured mechanisms for reporting and resolving observed 
irregularities; and (6) prohibit observers from engaging in disruptive 
behavior and empower election officials to ensure that observers follow the 
law.142  South Carolina is an example of a state with highly structured 
observation rules.  South Carolina’s statute allows candidates to appoint 
watchers at polling places.  The statute, however, also requires all candidates 
certified by a single political party to be jointly represented at each polling 
place by no more than two watchers from the party for each 1000 registered 
voters at that polling place.143  Further, watchers must be qualified voters in 
the county in which they are appointed to observe.144  Under its credentialing 
process, observers must present polling place election officials with a letter 
signed by the candidate or by an appropriate party official stating that they 
are certified to act as a watcher in that precinct, and they also must wear a 
badge specifying the name of the candidate or party they represent.145  South 
Carolina’s statute prohibits conversations between watchers and voters in the 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Greg Sargent, Opinion, An Anti-Trump Republican’s Agonizing Travails Point to Real 
Trouble Ahead, WASH. POST (May 26, 2021, 10:44 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/2021/05/26/brad-raffensperger-ga-recount-nyt/ [https://perma.cc/8AC6-3SZP] 
(noting that the trouble with transparency in post-2020 elections is that the “point of such 
efforts [like the Arizona audit] . . . is to manufacture ways to cast doubt on electoral outcomes 
in conscious and deliberate defiance of what full transparency and the facts reveal”). 
 140. Neal Kelley, Remote Observer Application, ORANGE CNTY. REGISTRAR OF VOTERS, 
https://ocvote.com/form/observer-request#no-back [https://perma.cc/53ZJ-72NH] (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 141. Id. 
 142. See supra note 124. 
 143. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-860 (2021). 
 144. Id. (“Each candidate . . . may appoint a watcher for any voting place where his name 
appears on the ballot . . . .  [C]andidates who are certified by a political party must be jointly 
represented at each polling place by not more than two watchers from the party for each one 
thousand registered voters.”). 
 145. Id. 
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polling place, and watchers may not interfere with the orderly conduct of the 
election or influence voters in the casting of their ballots.146 
A tradeoff for rigorous appointment, residency, credentialing, and badge 
requirements is that these mechanisms create barriers to entry for would-be 
observers.  In the past, trouble rallying enough volunteers to serve in the role 
of observer, especially during noncontroversial election cycles, may have 
prompted states to ease onerous requirements.  Adding structured 
transparency requirements back in may make recruiting sufficient numbers 
of observers more difficult.  Clear, uniform and not unnecessarily 
burdensome rules will help counter this concern—as will easily accessible 
training opportunities.147 
Regardless, the highly charged partisan environment today cautions 
against lax rules regarding who can observe and suggests that states should 
double down on structured transparency regimes.148 
D.  Use Transparency Technologies Thoughtfully 
Some surprisingly low-tech solutions have emerged to assist observers in 
absorbing and understanding what they are watching.  For example, some 
jurisdictions found that requiring election workers to wear color-coded vests 
helped those watching understand each worker’s role, and in some cases 
(when workers wore red or blue vests signifying their partisan affiliation), 
recognize that both Democratic and Republican election workers were 
present.149  Another low-tech solution is adding signage (either physically on 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Another problem with more stringent residency requirements is the increased 
difficulty for partisans to recruit observers in locations where they have fewer supporters—
precisely the places where partisan distrust might be highest.  This concern can be somewhat 
assuaged by limiting residency requirements to in-state as opposed to in-county or in-precinct. 
 148. Relatedly, some states have rules explicitly enabling members of the media to observe 
at elections. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-236(c) (2021) (describing how members of the 
news media may enter and leave the polling place at any time throughout the day to observe 
the election); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 4933(c) (2021) (“[M]edia and persons conducting exit 
polls shall be permitted within the 50-foot exclusion zone, but may not talk to persons who 
have not voted while in the 50-foot exclusion zone.”); MINN. STAT. § 204C.06 (2021) (“A 
news media representative may enter a polling place during voting hours only to observe the 
voting process.  A media representative must present photo identification to the head election 
judge upon arrival at the polling place, along with either a recognized media credential or 
written statement from a local election official attesting to the media representative’s 
credentials.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 7-112 (2021) (specifying that members of the media may 
be permitted inside the polling place for a period not exceeding five minutes); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 24.2-604.5 (2021) (specifying that members of the media may visit and film or photograph 
inside the polling place for a reasonable and limited amount of time); see also IND. CODE 
§ 3-6-10-1 (2021); IOWA CODE § 49.104 (2021); MD. CODE REGS. 33.07.04.02 (2021); Sarah 
Matthews et al., Election Legal Guide, REPS. COMM. FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, 
https://www.rcfp.org/resources/election-legal-guide/ [https://perma.cc/YDT5-3TML] (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2021) (providing state-by-state rules that apply to media coverage of election 
processes). 
 149. Phone Conversation with Jennifer Morrell, Co-founder, The Elections Grp. (Feb. 19, 
2021) (notes on file with author). 
2021] ELECTION OBSERVATION POST-2020 497 
location or as banners in the livestream) explaining the processes for 
in-person observers and/or livestreams.150 
Aside from low-tech solutions such as these, an important piece of 
contextualizing transparency in elections is ensuring thoughtful deployment 
of transparency technologies.  For example, election officials might consider 
recording election processes from multiple angles.  Such a recording need 
not be simultaneously broadcast but rather can be preserved on file as 
evidence if allegations of misconduct arise.151  A variation of this idea would 
be to record everything and livestream it but allow only those who have 
completed a comprehensive training on what they are seeing to view the feed, 
enabling these knighted remote observers to both report problems in real time 
and transmit assurances to candidates, parties, and the public.152 
Technology can also be used to help observers see better.  Rather than 
relying on a system of observers peering over shoulders (which can get 
complicated when many observers are present), screens can be mounted 
above election workers, magnifying their computer screens or workstations 
to help observers standing farther away see what is taking place.153  Coupled 
with rigorous training to help observers understand the processes election 
officials are engaged in, mounted screens that are strategically positioned can 
do a lot of work. 
Unfortunately, we have seen that even the most considered 
technology-augmented transparency measures fall prey when bad actors 
proceed in bad faith.  Even if the stream is narrated or features prominent 
signage explaining processes underway, bad-faith actors can (and likely will) 
manipulate these efforts—if not the footage itself—to serve their desired 
ends.154  Election officials designing transparency technology mechanisms 
must take these realities into account. 
E.  Pursue Uniformity 
Following the 2020 election, the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) issued a 
series of recommendations including that, “[n]o later than 60 days before an 
election, counties and states should produce and publicly display detailed 
observation procedures for the voting process, ballot reconciliation and 
canvass, recounts, and audits.”155  The report’s authors, informed by a 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. This idea draws on the same principles underpinning the impulse behind paper ballots 
and other means of verifying the voting process. See Appel & Stark, supra note 51, at 525. 
 152. Katyovi, supra note 7. 
 153. Conversation with Judd Choate, supra note 27 (describing screens mounted above 
election officials’ workstations to enable and facilitate election observation in Denver). 
 154. See Robert Chesney & Danielle K. Citron, Deep Fakes:  A Looming Challenge for 
Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1778–79 (2019) 
(describing concerns related to deep fake technology and the manipulation of elections). 
 155. Rachel Orey & Matthew Weil, Improving the Voting Experience After 2020, 
BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (Apr. 7, 2021), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/report/voting-experience-
2020/ [https://perma.cc/AZ6P-UEXP]. 
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bipartisan task force of election officials,156 recognized that clear observation 
rules, published well in advance of elections, go a long way in ensuring that 
observation mechanisms serve their desired purpose.  The BPC Report 
further recommended that, even in states where local officials create and 
implement election observation plans, “states should produce best practices 
for observation procedures that local jurisdictions can follow or expand 
upon.”157  This is a direct call for standardized election observation 
approaches statewide.  Uniform observation rules in a state will help counter 
narratives that election officials have something to hide. 
Because state elections—especially in presidential election years—do not 
operate in a bubble, Congress should consider implementing rules to 
standardize some aspects of election observation nationally.158  For example, 
in the interest of preventing chaos and the spread of misinformation and 
disinformation, Congress should consider prohibiting the use of devices by 
people other than election officials to record or photograph voters or voting 
processes in and around polling places in federal elections.159  Congress 
might also consider prohibiting states from criminalizing election official 
actions seeking to preserve orderly election observation and to prevent voter 
intimidation. 
Following the BPC’s recommendation, Congress should also consider 
legislation that, while accommodating variance in election observation rules, 
requires states to provide adequate notice to the public regarding who can 
observe and what observers can and cannot do.160  Congress might further 
require that states mandate election observer training so that observers can 
 
 156. Id.  The BPC recommendations stem from input by a task force BPC first convened 
in 2018 with the goal of putting “the voices of election officials first.” Id.  The original task 
force included “21 state and local election officials from diverse states and political 
ideologies.” Id.  After 2020, BPC expanded its “task force to include 28 state and local election 
officials from 20 states.” Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. The Voting Rights Act provides a mechanism for federal observation of state 
elections. See supra note 19.  What is proposed here would not change that process; it remains 
a critical tool to address discrimination in voting in the states. See The Voting Rights Act of 
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 52 
U.S.C.).  The Voting Rights Act authorizes the U.S. Department of Justice to dispatch federal 
observers to observe polling and ballot counting locations.  In the 1960s and 1970s, 
particularly, federal observers were an important part of documenting enduring discrimination 
and ensuring that laws intending to prevent discrimination took effect on the ground. See 
James Thomas Tucker, The Power of Observation:  The Role of Federal Observers Under the 
Voting Rights Act, 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 227, 230 (2007) (describing federal observers under 
the VRA as “non-lawyer employees of the United States Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM) authorized to observe ‘whether persons who are entitled to vote are being permitted to 
vote’ and ‘whether votes cast by persons entitled to vote are being properly tabulated’”); see 
also Cody Gray, Note, Savior Through Severance:  A Litigation-Based Response to Shelby 
County v. Holder, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49, 61–62 (2015) (arguing for expanded federal 
observation under the Voting Rights Act post-Shelby County). 
 159. Congress holds the power to regulate the administration of federal elections in the 
states. U.S. CONST. art 1., § 4, cl. 1. 
 160. The Freedom to Vote Act contains a provision constraining observer conduct.  See 
S. 2747, 117th Cong. § 303A(b) (2021) (prohibiting observers from being within eight feet of 
a voter or ballot). 
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contextualize what they see and understand the rules in place.  Federally 
mandated training would ensure that observers understand their rights and 
obligations and increase the likelihood that observers serve their function 
without impeding the process or disrupting or deterring eligible voters from 
casting lawful ballots. 
CONCLUSION 
There are no easy answers when it comes to restoring public trust in 
American elections.  With so many variables and challenges swirling, doing 
anything to repair public confidence seems Herculean.  Still, rethinking and 
reworking rules for election observation is a critical piece of the puzzle.  
States put election observation rules into place to engage the public in the 
election process, provide an important mechanism of oversight, and 
ultimately help ensure public buy-in of election outcomes.  Post-2020, these 
goals are more important than ever to pursue.  Reforming state observer rules 
should be prioritized to ensure they serve—and do not undermine—their 
critical purpose. 
